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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST|ATE OF UTAH 
GAYLA HATCH ANDERSON, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ! 
vs. ] 
MICHAEL HALL HATCH I 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
> Case No. 860225 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the outset of this Reply Brief defendant/appellant 
deems it necessary to reply to certain assertions made in the 
plaintiff/respondent's Statement of Facts. At page 2 thereof the 
plaintiff asserts, "Mrs. Hatch's attorney drafted a Stipulation 
which reflected the parties agreement. (R.58). It is included as 
Exhibit 'A' in the Addendum to this Brief." The Exhibit A shown 
in the Addendum has no signatures on it, was never filed in the 
action nor incorporated in the Findings, Conclusions or Decree, 
and is nothing more than an initial draft jwhich was prepared by 
plaintiff's counsel and which was rejected by the defendant. 
Plaintiff's statement that that stipulation reflects the parties' 
"agreement" is totally unjustified. 
Further, it should be noted that plaintiff's reference 
to page 58 of the record only refers to plaintiff's Affidavit. 
and that Affidavit doesn't even claim that the said unsigned 
Stipulation is the agreement of the parties. It only asserts 
that the unsigned Stipulation sets forth plaintiff's "intent." 
It is true that plaintiff (in her Verified Motion to 
Compel, R.57-65) asserts that the unsigned Stipulation sets forth 
what she desired, and she even states in paragraph 5 thereof 
(R.58): 
"The plaintiff, on the instructions of plaintiff's 
counsel, Nolan J. Olsen, signed a stipulation which was 
eventually filed and entered with this court, and the 
plaintiff was never notified that said stipulation 
contained language which varied from her above-described 
intent and understanding as to the disposition of the 
parties' marital residence." 
Any claim that the unsigned Stipulation sets forth the 
agreement of the parties is controverted by the fact that it 
wasn't even used and by the affidavit of the defendant (R.70-71) 
and of defendant's counsel, Leland K. Wimn^r (R.72-73). If the 
plaintiff is stating that her attorney, Nolan J. Olsen, did not 
carry out her instructions, then that is a matter between her and 
her attorney, but does not affect the validity of the actual 
Stipulation signed and filed in this action by Mr. Olsen and 
plaintiff, and in any event such a claim would seem to be rebutted 
by the fact that she signed the Stipulation along with her 
attorney and thereby approved the settlement as set forth in the 
signed Stipulation. Plaintiff does not claim that there was any 
fraud or trickery on the part of defendant or his attorney, and of 
course there was none. 
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We believe that the assertion of plaintiff that the 
signed Stipulation didn't set forth her "intent" lacks persuasion 
for several other reasons. First of all, the plaintiff as noted 
signed the document, and we can assume that she read it and had it 
explained to her by her counsel. Mr. Nolan Olsen is a reputable 
attorney of many years experience, and no doubt represented his 
clients1 interests fully and properly. Nowhere does plaintiff 
assert that she did not read the document or that she did not 
understand it, although she states in paragraph 4 that she "never 
waivered from her instructions to her previous counsel." The 
uncontroverted fact is that she signed a document at variance with 
those supposed instructions and thereby clearly "waivered" from 
any such earlier instructions to her counsel. Furthermore, we 
feel it is significant that there is no affidavit of Nolan J. 
Olsen on file in this matter, which one would suppose plaintiff 
would have obtained if there had been any error in the Stipulation 
as signed. One can only suppose that Nolan J. Olsen fully 
intended to enter into the actual Stipulation which was filed in 
this action, and that he did so with the assent of his client, who 
approved the Stipulation by placing her signature thereon. There 
would seem to be no question that Mr. Olsen intended to enter into 
the very Stipulation which was entered into and under clear 
authority plaintiff is bound by the actions taken by her counsel 
(and herself) who, it should be noted, actually drafted the 
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Findings, Conclusions and Decree which incorporated the 
Stipulation. It is inconceivable that Mr. Olsen could incorporate 
the Stipuation in the Findings, Conclusions and Decree and not 
know what it said and be confident that it incorporated his 
client's agreement. 
It should further be noted that at page 3 of the 
Statement of Facts of the plaintiff, in the final paragraph 
thereof, plaintiff refers to "Mrs. Hatch's retyped stipulation." 
We are unaware of any such document. Such a document does not 
appear in the record, nor is any such document attached to the 
Addendum in any Brief filed herein. It is an instrument unknown 
to the defendant and is apparently a non-existent document. 
Further, we desire to note that there are indeed a 
number of differences between the unsigned Stipulation and the 
Stipulation which was actually signed by the parties and filed in 
this action. It is interesting to note that the additional 
changes are substantial, were obviously negotiated by the parties, 
and no objection to any of the same is now raised by plaintiff, 
and plaintiff thereby acknowledges that considerable negotiations 
took place subsequent to the drafting of the unsigned Stipulation 
and prior to the execution of the Stipulation which was actually 
signed by the parties and accepted by the court. They are 
reflected in the following changes: 
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Unsigned Stipulation Stipulation signed 
(R.66,67) and filed (R.15-17) 
$150 per child support money $100 per child support money 
Defendant maintain medical Defendant maintain health 
insurance and life insurance and life insurance only so 
long as available to him 
at his employment 
Defendant pay $350 additional Each; party assume own 
attorney's fees attorney's fees and costs 
No reference to marriage Plaintiff agrees to continue 
counseling existing marriage counseling 
It should further be noted that the plaintiff claims in 
her Verified Motion (R.57-65) that the provisions of the unsigned 
Stipulation were to have been incorporated in the signed 
Stipulation and would accordingly give her the first option to 
acquire the property (1) when she remarried, or (2) when the 
youngest child reached majorityf or (3) when she desired to sell 
the home. Nevertheless, in paragraph 12 of her Affidavit (R.60) 
plaintiff asserts that she "advised the defendant of such 
listings." If the plaintiff had the first option to buy out the 
defendant when she desired to sell the property, then to be 
consistent, she should have notified the defendant that she was 
selling the property and tendered him his money. Plaintiff didn't 
do this and doesn't assert that she did. Instead of that, she 
alleges that she "advised the defendant of such listings" as 
though that somehow resulted in a waiver on his part. If the 
plaintiff had the first option, which was triggered when she 
elected to sell the property, and she did Inot tender the money to 
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the defendant, then one can safely assume that at the very least 
she waived her first option. Even under plaintiff's version this 
would give the defendant the next option to acquire the property. 
Notwithstanding that, the plaintiff went to great lengths in 
paragraphs 11 through 17 to show how defendant waived his first 
option. That would seem to be inconsistent with plaintiff's 
version that she had the first option. Of course defendant 
disputes that he was ever given notice of the aforesaid listings 
or of plaintiff's remarriage and, as stated in his Affidavit, he 
at no time waived, nor intended to waive, his first option, which 
the Decree of Divorce clearly gave him. Commissioner Peuler found 
in her first recommendation (R.51) that there was no evidence that 
defendant "failed to exercise his option" and that recommendation 
was not timely objected to by plaintiff as required by Rule 8 of 
Third District Local Rules, copy of which is included in the 
Addendum to appellant's initial Brief herein. Even if plaintiff 
had timely objected to the Commissioner's recommendation, the 
issue of "waiver" of defendant's first option was never thereafter 
tried, and no finding of fact made thereon one way or the other by 
Judge Dee, nor indeed could there have been as no testimony was 
ever permitted in this action. 
At page 7 of plaintiff's Statement of Facts, it is 
asserted that Mr. Hatch at no time offered to purchase Mrs. 
Hatch's equity. That is inaccurate. Defendant was not aware of 
the existence of the contingencies which permitted him to exercise 
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his option until the Order to Show Cause was commenced oy tne 
plaintiff* In his Answer to that Order to Show Cause (R.52-53) 
defendant clearly stated his willingness to acquire plaintiff's 
equity in accordance with the provisions of the Decree of Divorce. 
Further, it should be noted that even if the unexecuted 
Stipulation were binding on the parties, the provision therein 
which would have allowed plaintiff to exercise her "first option 
to acquire the property" was triggered when she desired to "sell" 
the home. Plaintiff seeks to acquire the home, not sell it. 
At page 8 of the Statement of Facts, with reference to 
private discussions between Commissioner Peuler and Mr. 
Pignanelli, the plaintiff asserts that: 
"A letter advising Mr. Hatch's counsel of these 
discussions was sent to him in August of 1985. (See 
Exhibit 'D' included in the Addendum to this Brief)." 
That statement is entirely erroneous. Not only were the 
conversations between defendant's counsel and Commissioner Peuler 
irregular without counsel for defendant being present, but the 
said Exhibit "D" is not dated until September 13, 1985, and was 
received by counsel for the defendant some time thereafter. 
Counsel for the defendant was not aware that Mr. Pignanelli had 
entered the case until receipt of that letter sometime after 
September 13, 1985. 
At page 9 of the plaintiff's Statement of Facts 
plaintiff asserts that the Order of October 9, 1985, was not 
submitted to Mr. Pignanelli. That is true, but the Order was 
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served upon Mrs. Hatch in August 1985. (R.80) Also, Notice 
requiring plaintiff to Appear in Person or Obtain New Counsel was 
served upon plaintiff in August before counsel for the defendant 
knew that Mr. Pignanelli had appeared in the action for plaintiff. 
(R.56) As Mr. Wimmer did not know that plaintiff had retained Mr. 
Pignanelli, it was proper for him to serve plaintiff herself. 
Respondent's Brief asserts that the Order of October 9, 1985, was 
not sent to Mr. Pignanelli by defendant's counsel, but said Brief 
does not claim that Mrs. Hatch did not give Mr. Pignanelli her 
copy of the proposed Order, and Mr. Pignanelli in fact received a 
copy of the Commissioner's recommendation (R.51). 
At the bottom of page 9 plaintiff asserts that: 
"at the November 6, 1985, hearing, counsel for both 
parties presented argument to the court and submitted 
documents and Affidavits in support of their respective 
positions." 
That did not happen if plaintiff intends by that to imply that new 
information was given to the Court. It is true that counsel for 
defendant furnished some documents from his file to the Court as 
the Court did not even have the original file present, but there 
were no documents submitted at that time which were not already in 
the file. Furthermore, there was no argument on the merits of the 
case, but only with regard to the preliminary matter of whether or 
not the Court should give independent consideration to the case or 
merely adopt the recommendations of Commissioner Peuler as a 
matter of course. Counsel were never permitted to argue the 
merits of the case. 
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It should be noted that there is no minute entry in the 
file showing a hearing (or anything else for that matter) before 
Judge Dee on November 6, 1985, nor is ther$ a memorandum decision, 
nor any other indication that a hearing was held on November 6, 
1985, except the reference thereto in the Order of March 19, 1986, 
(R.93-95), which Order in its entirety is the subject of this 
appeal, and with respect to which defendant asserts that there was 
no hearing held on that date as the Court <^ id not have the file, 
did not have a clerk and did not have a reporter. There should 
have been a minute entry indicating that the matter (which was set 
for hearing that day) was continued without date, but no such 
minute entry has ever been prepared, and that apparently for the 
reason that there was no clerk present to jnake such a notation. 
Finally, at page 10 of plaintiff]1 s Statement of Facts, 
plaintiff states that after the Court later indicated that he was 
going to affirm Commissioner Peuler's ruling, her counsel prepared 
and submitted proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an 
Order. It is correctly stated that defendant's counsel objected 
to the proposed Findings and Conclusions, but plaintiff fails to 
state that defendant also objected to the Order. (R.90-91) In 
those objections (R.90-91) defendant pointed out to the Court that 
the Court had already ruled on this matter and noted that no 
evidentiary hearing had been permitted and that therefore no 
Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law or Order could be made. 
Plaintiff also correctly states at page 10 of her Brief that: 
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"Judge Dee ruled that a Finding of Fact and Con-
clusion of Law were not necessary in connection with 
the respective motions and that he would sign Mr. 
Pignanelli's proposed Order which reflected his 
affirmation of Commissioner Peuler's recommendation." 
That is exactly what Judge Dee didf but he did not, and could not, 
rule on disputed issues of fact as raised by the respective 
Affidavits of the parties without taking evidence. Indeed, Judge 
Dee appears to have attempted to circumvent the need for an 
evidentiary hearing by declaring in the Order of March 19, 1986, 
what the "intent of the Decree of Divorce" was (R.94). Since the 
language of the Decree is clear, Judge Dee erred in rewriting that 
language and, even if the language were deetmed to be ambiguous, 
then Judge Dee erred in assuming that he is not required to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine "intent." 
Plaintiff also correctly states in the concluding 
paragraph of her Statement of Facts at page 10 of her Brief that: 
"no transcript of any of the above hearings was made, 
nor has appellant presented a statement of evidence or 
proceedings . . . " 
The reason for that is that there was no testimony taken, no 
one was sworn, and no hearing took place on November 6, 1985. 
Therefore, there is no transcript, and no statement of the 
evidence or proceedings is possible because there is none. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant will now respond to the argument of the 
plaintiff, and will treat the subject matter of each of the 
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plaintiff's points in the same order as contained in plaintiff/ 
respondent's brief. 
POINT I. APPELLANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE A 
TRANSCRIPT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN REVERSAL OF THE LOWER COURT'S 
DECISION. 
Plaintiff asserts in her Point I that because appellant 
did not provide a transcript, the trial court's decision must be 
affirmed. This assertion is clearly erroneous. Plaintiff asserts 
that on November 6, 1985, the Court requested the parties to state 
their respective positions, and that each Submitted copies of 
motions filed and affidavits and supporting documents, and that no 
objection to this procedure was made by the appellants, nor did 
appellant request that the proceedings be reported. The Court did 
not request the parties to state their respective positions on the 
merits of the case, nor for that matter on anything. It is true 
that each of the parties stated their position with respect to 
whether a hearing should be had or whether the Court could simply 
as a matter of course adopt the Commissioner's recommendation. 
There was, however, no argument on the merits of the case. It is 
true that counsel's copies of certain documents already in the 
file were handed to the judge because he did not even have the 
file, but those were not submitted in connection with a hearing, 
nor did the defendant understand that a hearing was being held. 
It should be noted that counsel |for the respondent does 
not dispute the fact that there was no clerk present, that there 
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was no court reporter present, and that the file was not present, 
and he does not deny that there is no minute entry and no 
transcript. We respectfully suggest that none of the normal 
indicia of a hearing are present in this action. 
Under those circumstances the Court could not and did 
not conduct a hearing, and certainly no responsible judge would 
have attemped to do so. Indeed Rule 7(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, applies to such a situation and requires a continuance 
in such a case. The rule states: 
" . . . When on the day fixed for the hearing of a 
motion or an order to show cause, the judge before whom 
such motion or order is to be heard is unable to hear 
the parties, the matter shall stand continued until the 
further order of the court, or it may be transferred by 
the court or judge to some other judge of the court for 
such hearing." 
Thus, when Judge Dee was not able to hear the motion, it was 
continued automatically, even without being so ordered by the 
Court and without minute entry. 
One is compelled to ask, "How does one protect oneself 
from a result such as this where counsel go» into chambers to talk 
with the judge about preliminary matters, and the judge says he 
will not proceed further that day, but will get the file and 
review it?" Counsel for the respondent seemed to be saying that 
counsel for appellant had a duty to get a reporter into judge's 
chambers in order to record what the judge said. But the fallacy 
of this argument is that there is no obligation to request a court 
reporter for a non-hearing. It should be noted that even if 
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defendant had requested a court reporter arid been denied by the 
judge, there is no way to prove such in the absence of a court 
reporter. If Judge Dee considered what happened on that day as a 
hearing, it would only be in the sense that he felt that he could 
adopt the recommendation of Commissioner Peuler as a matter of 
law, and as that matter was in a preliminary manner addressed by 
counselr there might be some justification for saying that the 
matter of adopting the Commissioner's recommendation without a 
hearing on the merits was considered by the Court. If that 
position is takenf it is so clearly erroneous as to require very 
little argument on our part. It is clear that the judge must 
conduct some kind of a meaningful, independent hearing and is not 
permitted to adopt the recommendations of Commissioner Peuler in 
every single case as a matter of course and without a hearing on 
the merits. Otherwise, the whole procedure is ridiculous. Even 
Judge Dee did not pretend that there was an evidentiary hearing 
because when it was later called to his attention that there had 
been no evidentiary hearingf he declined to sign Findings of Fact 
or Conclusions of Law. So he apparently felt that he could adopt 
the Commissioner's recommendation as a matter of law. 
Counsel did object to the Court's statement that it was 
his practice to affirm the Commissioner. The Court declined to 
proceed further and said that he would review the filef presumably 
to determine if an evidentiary hearing was necessary, and 
reschedule the case for hearing. In that event Judge Dee then no 
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doubt concluded (erroneously we feel) that he could affirm the 
Commissioner's recommendation without an evidentiary hearing as a 
matter of law. 
We respectfully submit that the Court could perhaps have 
ruled as a matter of law that the Affidavit of the plaintiff did 
not state a cause of action. But we respectfully submit that 
the Court could not make the opposite determination without an 
evidentiary hearing as factual issues had to be resolved and 
evidence taken by reason of the opposing Affidavits filed by 
the parties. It is true that defendant has not submitted a 
transcript^ but there was no hearing held to be recorded. 
There were no witnesses called; no one was sworn. 
The cases cited by the plaintiff are totally 
inapplicable to this situation. It is grossly unfair for the 
plaintiff to contend that defendant was charged with a duty of 
providing the transcript of a non-existent hearing. 
In Point I of her Brief plaintiff cites five Utah cases. 
These cases simply stand for the proposition that where there has 
been an evidentiary hearirg in the lower court (which was the fact 
in each of those cases), that the Supreme Court is unable to, and 
therefore will notf canvass the facts unless a transcript of the 
evidence is furnished. One of the cases there cited by the 
plaintiff is Sawyers v. Sawyers, 558 P2d 607 (Utah, 1976) 
(See page 14 of plaintiff's brief.) Among other things from 
the Sawyers decision plaintiff cites the following: 
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"And, as under elementary principles of appellate review 
we ' . . . presume the findings of the court to have 
been supported by admissible competent, substantial 
evidence . . . ', we affirm." 
That is no doubt the correct principle in cases where 
there has been evidence presented. In the instant case, however, 
there was, by plaintiff's own admission, no evidence presented; 
there was, by plaintiff's own admission, no testimony; no 
witnesses were called, and no one was sworh. 
We respectfully submit that the reasoning of those cases 
is wholly inapplicable to this case where there has been no 
evidence presented and no findings made. This Court is not 
required to "presume" that there is "substantial evidence" when 
all parties admit that there was no evidence presented. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT ENTITLED TO EXERCISE 
DISCRETION TO INTERPRET PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND 
CERTAINLY HAS NO DISCRETION TO REWRITE THAT PARAGRAPH. 
In plaintiff's Point II plaintiff seems to be saying 
that the language of paragraph 5 is ambiguous, and therefore the 
Court has discretion to interpret it, and even if it is not 
ambiguous, it is unfair and therefore the court can modify the 
Decree anyway in its discretion. We respectfully submit that the 
trial court cannot indulge "discretion" in matters of interpre-
tation. In interpreting the document the trial court is required 
to interpret it in accordance with its clear intent if that intent 
can be determined from the four corners of the document, and it 
certainly can be determined in this instance. The interpretation 
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of the document is an objective undertaking and is not a matter of 
"discretion" which is subjective in its nature. 
Further, it should be noted that it is not the intention 
of the parties that is determinative in the matter of construction 
of a judgment or decree. The construction of a judgment calls for 
determining the intent of the Court that entered it. In 46 Am Jur 
2d, Judgments, Section 73, it states: 
"As a general rule, judgments are to be construed 
like other written instruments. The determinative 
factor is the intention of the court, as gathered not 
from an isolated part thereof, but from all parts of the 
judgment itself." 
In the instant case the judge that entered the Decree 
had before him a written Stipulation, which he approved, and when 
he signed the Decree of Divorce he clearly intended to incorporate 
that very Stipulation in the Decree in the form in which it was 
filed in the action. There is no way the Court could have known 
any secret "intent" of the plaintiff, assuming that there was 
such. The Court intended the Decree to mean just what it says. 
To allow the Court to rewrite the Decree, cis it has done, 
constitutes an unlawful and improper collateral attack on the 
Decree under the guise of "interpretation." See 46 Am Jur 2d, 
Judgments, Section 72. 
Fairness of the Decree is not an issue here, but even if 
it were, it certainly cannot be said that the Stipulation as 
agreed to by the parties and adopted by the Court in the Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree and allowed to stand for ten years is 
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unfair. The parties negotiated the settlement of this action. 
Disposition of the house was only one aspect of the settlement and 
was negotiated and approved by the parties. Plaintiff was 
permitted to live in the home by paying a very modest mortgage 
payment, and that arrangement could not be said to be unfair. 
The trial court did not make a finding or ruling that 
the Decree was unfair. The trial court's decision was based upon 
what it determined the "intent" of the Decree to be. Paragraph 1 
of the Court's Order states: "That the intent of the Decree of 
Divorce entered in this court on November |21, 1975, as evidenced 
by the stipulation, is that the defendant is to receive the one-
half share of his equity based upon the ampunt of equity existing 
i 
at the time of the Decree." We respectfully submit that it is 
entirely impossible for the Court to determine that such was the 
intention of the Court from the four corners of the document. The 
document most clearly states the opposite. 
Furthermore, the Affidavits of the respective parties 
were contradictory, and no evidence was taken by the Court from 
which it could have determined what the "intent" of the parties 
was aside from the clear language of the document even if such 
intent were relevant. Certainly the decision of the lower court 
cannot be supported on the basis of unfairtness to the plaintiff. 
The Court can only modify a decree of divorce upon a material and 
permanent change of circumstances, and thqre has been no 
allegation or proof of any such change. 
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As stated in Land v. Land, 605 P2d 1248, at page 1251: 
"Equity is not available to reinstate rights and 
privileges voluntarily contracted away because one has 
come to regret the bargain made. Accordingly, the law 
limits the continuing jurisdiction of the court where 
property settlement agreement has been incorporated into 
the decree, and the outright abrogation of the 
provisions of such agreement is only to be resorted to 
with great reluctance and for compelling reasons." 
If this Court considers this matter one which might fall 
within the definition of "compelling reasons," then at the very 
least those compelling reasons should be explored in an 
evidentiary hearing. So far as known to appellant, this Court has 
not stated what would constitute "compelling reasons." However it 
would seem to require at the very least a canvassing of all of the 
facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the Decree 
as well as any permanent, material change of circumstances during 
the ten years since the entry of the Decree. 
We do not think that DeBry v. DeBry, 27 Ut 2d 337, 496 
P2d 92 (1972), assists plaintiff. In that case the defendant 
(wife) signed a Stipulation without the assistance of counsel, and 
a Decree of Divorce was entered based upon the Stipulation. Some 
five weeks later (and while the Decree was still interlocutory, 
but presumably after the time for appeal had expired) the wife 
moved to vacate the Decree, set aside her default, and be 
permitted her to file her Answer and Counterclaim. After a 
hearing was held on the Motion to Vacate, the trial judge denied 
her requested relief. On appeal the Supreme Court seemed to feel 
that the Stipulation might have been improvidently entered into by 
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her (without counsel) and that the lower court should conduct a 
full hearing on the matterf and accordingly the Supreme Court 
vacated the Decree of Divorce and sent the case back for a full 
plenary hearing on all financial aspects of the case. That case 
therefore involved in effect a Rule 60(b) Motion to Vacate the 
Decree which the Supreme Court felt should have been granted, and 
accordingly reversed and remanded the matter for full hearing. 
In this case plaintiff has never made a motion to 
vacate the Decree, and accordingly the Decree must stand and be 
interpreted according to the four corners jthereof, which can be 
done witout resort to extraneous matters. Furthermore, the action 
of the plaintiff in DeBry was taken within five weeks after the 
entry of the Decree, whereas in the instant case the plaintiff has 
permitted over ten years to elapse and certainly is guilty of 
laches. In this action plaintiff had counsel, whereas the wife 
had no attorney in DeBry. At the very least the DeBry case stands 
for the proposition that substantial modifying of a decree should 
not be undertaken without a full evidentiary hearing. That has 
never been afforded to defendant in the instant action. 
POINT III(A). THE FAILURE TO SUBMIT A COPY OF THE 
PROPOSED ORDER OF OCTOBER 9, 1985, TO MR. PIGNANELLI DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE THE DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA. 
Point III(A) of the respondent's Brief appears to 
state that defendant was required to serve a copy of the proposed 
Order which was signed by Judge Dee on October 9, 1985, on Mr. 
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Pignanelli. It is true that Rule 2.9(b), Third District Local 
Rules, requires that copies of a proposed order be served upon 
opposing counsel before being presented to the court for 
signature. However, we respectfully submit that that rule only 
applies to attorneys who have made an appearance in the action and 
therefore are known to opposing counsel. In the instant case the 
hearing before Commissioner Peuler was conducted with Nolan J. 
Olsen appearing for the plaintiff. Mr. Olsen withdrew from the 
action on July 19, 1985, (R.50) and Commissioner Peuler's 
recommendation was made on August 23, 1985, (R.51). Thereafter 
Mr. Wimmer, counsel for defendant, served ci Notice to Appoint 
Counsel or Represent Self (R.56) upon plaintiff, and also sent a 
copy of the proposed Order to the plaintiff herself (R.80). Both 
of those documents were served in August prior to defendant's 
counsel, Leland K. Wimmer, receiving the letter and notice from 
Mr. Pignanelli announcing his appearance in the action sometime 
subsequent to September 13, 1985. Accordingly, the proposed Order 
was properly served on plaintiff herself and was not required to 
be served upon Mr. Pignanelli. 
Although plaintiff claims that the Order of October 9, 
1985, is not final because a copy thereof was not served upon Mr. 
Pignanelli, it should be noted that Mr. Pignanelli has not 
disputed that he received a copy of Commissioner Peuler's 
recommendation dated M8-23-85" (R.76) and which indicates that it 
was sent to counsel on "8-26-85" and contains Mr. Pignanelli's 
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name. Defendant's attorney, Leland K. Wimmer, is blind and didn't 
read Mr. Pignanelli's name thereon, nor did his secretary read it 
to him, and Mr. Pignanelli's name thereon was not noticed until co-
counsel discovered it there in connection with work on this 
appeal. 
Rule 8 of the Third District Court Rules states that a 
party has only five days in which to object to a recommendation, 
and states in subparagraph (d) of said Rule 8: 
"If no objection or request for further hearing is 
made within five (5) days, the party shall be deemed to 
have consented to entry of an order in conformance with 
the Commissioner's recommendation." 
Therefore, even if the Court should feel that a copy of 
the Order should have been served upon Mr. Pignanelli, inasmuch as 
Mr. Pignanelli did not timely object to the recommendation, the 
plaintiff is "deemed to have consented to entry of an order" and 
therefore defendant is entitled to the Order of October 9, 1985, 
as a matter of law. Even if the proposed Order signed October 9, 
1985, should have been served on Mr. Pignanelli, the Utah cases 
cited by plaintiff only stand at most for the proposition that 
such an Order is not final for purposes of appeal. If defendant 
is entitled to the entry of the Order under Rule 8, then such a 
judgment must logically be a bar to the Order of March 19, 1986. 
If the judgment of October 9, 1985, is not deemed final, that 
merely means that plaintiff can still appeal it, but it still 
stands as a bar to the later Order unless the plaintiff does 
appeal and this Court reverses. 
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Calfo v, D. C. Stewart Co,, 717 P2d 697 (Utah, 1986), 
involved a situation where a summary judgment was entered, but 
Rule 2.9(b) was not complied with. Thereafter the trial court 
entered another order stating that: 
"the summary judgment entered by the court on January 
14, 1982 ... was properly signed and entered by the 
court on said date and is in full force and effect..." 
The Supreme Court thus in effect held that the second order 
constituted a filing of the first order, thereby recogizing the 
first order as a valid order except that the appeal time ran from 
the entry of the second order. 
It would therefore seem that the order of October 9, 
1985, (even if Rule 2.9(b) had not been complied with) was valid 
for all purposes except to start the appeal time running, and 
certainly bars the Order of March 19, 1986. 
It therefore appears to be inescapable that the judgment 
of October 9, 1985, has been duly entered, or at the very least 
defendant is entitled to have it entered under said Rule 8(d). We 
respectfully submit that such valid, existing judgment (or entitle-
ment to judgment) cannot simply be ignored. Our Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide that a judgment can be amended or vacated in 
accordance with Rule 52(b), Rule 59 or Rule 60. None of those 
rules have been called upon by plaintiff to vacate or amend the 
Order of October 9, 1985, and it does not appear that any of the 
provisions of said rules are applicable to this case. The 
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judgment of October 9, 1985f has thus not been amended or vacated 
in accordance with Rule 52(b), Rule 59 or Rule 60, nor has the 
judgment of March 19, 1986, been entered pursuant to application 
of said rules, and the said March 19 judgment is therefore void. 
In Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P2d 
798 (1964), this Court held that a second judgment, not having 
been entered in compliance with Rule 52(b) or Rule 59(b), was 
void. We believe the same rule to be applicable in the instant 
case. 
POINT IIKB). DEFENDANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PLEAD RES 
JUDICATA AS A DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION TO COMPEL. 
Plaintiff asserts that defendant was required to raise 
in writing the defense of res judicata to Ithe Verified Motion to 
Compel Defendant to Execute Quit-claim Deed and Requesting Clari-
fication of Decree. We respectfully submit that that is not the 
law. Rule 8(c), URCP, requires res judicata to be raised as an 
affirmative defense in an answer to a complaint or counterclaim or 
reply to counterclaim, but does not require it to be raised in 
writing in response to a motion. A motion is not a pleading 
within the meaning of Rule 7(a), URCP. The Rules of Civil 
Procedure nowhere require the Rule 8(c) affirmative defenses to be 
raised in writing responding to motions, nor do they require a 
written answer or reply to a motion at al^ .. The matter would have 
been raised at the hearing before Judge D^e on November 6, 1985, 
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if there had been a hearing. However no hearing was held on that 
date. The response of the defendant to the said Verified Motion 
was by Affidavit of the defendant (R. 70, 71) and of his attorney 
(R.72, 73), both of which were served on September 27, 1985, and 
accordingly before the entry of the aforesaid Order of October 9, 
and therefore the fact of the entry thereof could not be included 
in said Affidavits. The fact of the entry of the said Order of 
October 9, 1985, as a bar to further proceedings was raised before 
Judge Dee prior to entry of his judgment of March 19, 1986, in 
paragraph 2 of the Objections served and filed by the defendant on 
March 3, 1986. (R.90-91). Said Objections were heard by the Court 
on March 19, 1986. (See paragraph 10 of defendant's Brief.) The 
issue therefore was clearly raised in the lower court. 
POINT IV. THE PLAINTIFF HAS REQUESTED IN EFFECT A 
MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
In her Point IV plaintiff denies that she is asking for 
modification of the Decree of Divorce. If the plaintiff is not 
requesting modification of the Decree of Divorce, then as 
hereinabove noted, the Court can only interpret the Decree of 
Divorce from the four corners thereof when the intention is clear 
from the document itself, which indisputably it is in the instant 
case; therefore, if counsel is not asking for modification of the 
Decree, there is no way that the courts at this time can consider 
the question of "intent" or "fairness" of the Decree of Divorce 
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or any other matter beyond the four corners of the document. We 
therefore submit that if the plaintiff is not asking for modifi-
cation of the Decree, the courts are limited to interpreting the 
meaning of the Decree of Divorce from the four corners thereof, 
which clearly precludes the relief sought by the plaintiff in her 
Motion to Compel. 
If, on the other hand, the plaintiff is seeking 
modification of the Decree, then we believe that she must like-
wise fail for the reasons set forth in Land v. Land, supra. 
POINT V. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO NO ATTORNEYS FEES OR 
COSTS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL. 
We believe that the decision of the lower court was 
erroneous, that defendant has been entitled to resist the same 
below and in this Court, and that accordingly no award of 
attorney's fees or costs to the plaintiff is justified. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons we believe that the Order of 
March 19, 1986, should be reversed and that the language of the 
Decree of Divorce be thus adjudged to be clear and unequivocal, 
and accordingly that defendant has the first option to acquire the 
property as set out in the Decree of Divorce, and that defendant 
has not waived that option. 
If this Court shall not grant the foregoing relief, then 
the Order of March 19, 1986, should be vacated and the defendant 
-25-
granted, at the very least, a full evidentiary hearing in the 
District Court. 
LELAND K. WIMMER 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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